Publications |
PEER-REVIEWED CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS[3] “Inconsistent Reasoning in the Sciences and Strategic-Logical Pluralism”
forthcoming in Southwest Philosophical Studies. Forthcoming. INCONSISTENCY [Preprint] [2] "A modal reading of Newcomb's problem" (Joint with Gabrielle Ramos-Garcia) (in Spanish) [1] “The (in)consistency of the bernoullian infinitesimals” (in Spanish) (Second author | joint with Luis Estrada-González) en Fernando Macías Romero et al., (eds.), Memorias del Segundo Congreso Internacional de Matemáticas y sus Aplicaciones, Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla: México, pp. 195-200, 2015. INCONSISTENCY [Preprint] [Translation to English (by Claudia Tanus-Pimentel)] |
WORK IN PROGRESSUnder review THE VALUE OF HISTORICALLY INACCURATE RECONSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
ABSTRACT The value of historically inaccurate reconstructions for the philosophy of science: Some reflections on understanding, exemplifying and reinforcing. Here I propose that philosophers can still benefit (in a non-trivial way) from philosophically biased and historically inaccurate historical reconstructions. In particular, I argue that historical reconstructions, even if philosophically biased, can play another equally important role: to enhance our understanding of philosophical theses about science by clarifying some of their concepts or applications. Handout mAKING SENSE OF THE USE OF DEFECTIVE INFORMATION IN THE SCIENCES (With otávio bueno)
ABSTRACT Although much current scientific practice makes use of big data and scientists have struggled to explain precisely how do big data and machine learning algorithms actually work, they still trust some significant chunks that these datasets contain. Here we clarify how, from a reliabilist point of view, we can make sense of the continued trust placed by scientists in defective information consistently with ascribing rationality to them. We use a Partial Structures approach to explain that the methods that scientists use for working with extremely large data sets are trustworthy as they preserve (and increase) the veracity of the information –even if scientists cannot disclose all the mechanisms of the methods that they use. We illustrate this with a case study from cosmology. THE Challenge of the illusion: Understanding defective theories (with moisés macías-bustos)
ABSTRACT Here we content that when scientists report having understood a defective theory, even if clearly false or impossible, their claim might be legitimate. We argue that scientists understand a defective theory if they can recognize the theory's underlying pattern(s) and if they can reconstruct and explain what is going on in specific cases of defective theories as well as consider what the theory would do if not-defective –even before finding ways of fixing it. A paper on scientific understanding and belief revision (with Tomasz Jarmużek )
Scientific understanding has been considered to be mainly composed by “knowledge about relations of dependence. When one understands something, one can make all kinds of correct inferences about it” (Ylikoski 2013: 100). And while everybody agrees on the value of understanding in scientific contexts there are still two main open question concerning its nature: (i) which is the epistemic commitment involved in understanding (cf. Gordon 2017), and (ii) which type of elements can figure into the understanding’s content. In the corresponding literature, (i) and (ii) have been largely addressed separately, as if they were, at least methodologically, independent. In this paper we propose to change the strategy by discussing the preservation of scientific understanding after belief revision as a phenomenon that requires (i) and (ii) to be treated together, and we contend that this will shed light on the general grounds of scientific understanding in a novel way.
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