Publicaciones |
MEMORIAS EN CONGRESOS[1] “Inconsistent Reasoning in the Sciences and Strategic-Logical Pluralism” en Southwest Philosophical Studies (por aparecer).
[Borrador] [2] “La (in)consistencia de los infinitesimales bernoullianos” (segundo autor | con Luis Estrada-González) Fernando Macías Romero et al., eds., Memorias del Segundo Congreso Internacional de Matemáticas y sus Aplicaciones, Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla: México, pp. 195-200, 2015. [Borrador] [Translation to English (by Claudia Tanus Pimentel)] |
TRABAJO EN PROGRESOABSTRACT The value of historically inaccurate reconstructions for the philosophy of science: Some reflections on understanding, exemplifying and reinforcing. Here I propose that philosophers can still benefit (in a non-trivial way) from philosophically biased and historically inaccurate historical reconstructions. In particular, I argue that historical reconstructions, even if philosophically biased, can play another equally important role: to enhance our understanding of philosophical theses about science by clarifying some of their concepts or applications. MAKING SENSE OF THE USE OF DEFECTIVE INFORMATION IN THE SCIENCES (con OTÁVIO BUENO)
ABSTRACT Although much current scientific practice makes use of big data and scientists have struggled to explain precisely how do big data and machine learning algorithms actually work, they still trust some significant chunks that these datasets contain. Here we clarify how, from a reliabilist point of view, we can make sense of the continued trust placed by scientists in defective information consistently with ascribing rationality to them. We use a Partial Structures approach to explain that the methods that scientists use for working with extremely large data sets are trustworthy as they preserve (and increase) the veracity of the information –even if scientists cannot disclose all the mechanisms of the methods that they use. We illustrate this with a case study from cosmology. THE CHALLENGE OF THE ILLUSION: UNDERSTANDING DEFECTIVE THEORIES (con MOISÉS MACÍAS BUSTOS)
ABSTRACT Here we content that when scientists report having understood a defective theory, even if clearly false or impossible, their claim might be legitimate. We argue that scientists understand a defective theory if they can recognize the theory's underlying pattern(s) and if they can reconstruct and explain what is going on in specific cases of defective theories as well as consider what the theory would do if not-defective –even before finding ways of fixing it. TERMINADO Una lectura modal del problema de Newcomb (con gabrielle ramos garcía)
Este artículo tiene dos objetivos principales; primero, ofrecemos un análisis filosófico del Problema de Newcomb (en adelante, PNcomb), que es uno de los objetos de interés más importantes de la teoría de la decisión. Segundo, discutimos brevemente algunas de las condiciones bajo las cuales herramientas formales como la lógica modal son de ayuda en el estudio de las problemáticas de la decisión racional, en particular, PNcomb.
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