

Tarea 2b

RESUMEN

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Here I aim at providing interesting responses to two important questions from the philosophy of science, namely: *Can philosophers of science benefit (in a significant way) from historically inaccurate historical reconstructions?* and *What has history of science said about the limits of the philosophical thesis of inconsistency toleration in science?* On the one hand, it is commonly argued that history of science has the main role of either supporting or falsifying philosophical theses (Popper 1934; Kuhn 1970; Lakatos 1970; Laudan 1977; Nickles 1986, 1995; Vickers forthcoming). Additionally, it is expected that, in order to fulfill such task, historical information is used highly accurately when facing philosophical claims (Pitt 2001, Schickore 2011, Kinzel 2015). On the other hand, the case of intertheoretic inconsistency is fascinating in itself, as not many case studies have been provided as exemplars of intertheoretic inconsistency. What is more important, some of these paradigmatic exemplars have been claimed to be historically inaccurate (Davey 2014). The combination of these facts leaves us with the impression that the history of science might have shown the limits of the philosophical thesis of inconsistency toleration in science. Hence the importance of addressing both questions together.

Here I will argue that historical reconstructions, even if not historically accurate, can play another equally important role: to enhance our understanding of philosophical theses about science by clarifying some of their concepts or applications (Martínez-Ordaz and Estrada-González forthcoming). Furthermore, I will claim that even if the reconstructions presented to illustrate intertheoretic inconsistencies are historically inaccurate, as it has been claimed (Davey 2014), this inaccuracy is not problematic enough for rejecting the philosophical thesis about intertheoretic inconsistency toleration in science. I will argue that such reconstructions have significantly helped to select and modify the methodological criteria used for identifying cases of intertheoretic inconsistency toleration, and thus, helped philosophers of science to achieve better understanding of the phenomenon of inconsistency toleration in science.

In order to do so, I will proceed as follows: First I will introduce the debate around inconsistency toleration in science and I will argue that reconstructions of scientific episodes have the main purpose of increasing our knowledge, although not only about the reconstruction's object of study, but perhaps also

about a particular case study, a specific scientific context, or even about our philosophical approaches to science. Later on I will introduce the case of intertheoretic inconsistencies in science. Finally, I will explain how the historical reconstructions of intertheoretic inconsistencies in science, even if not historically accurate, could help us to achieve a better understanding of the general thesis of inconsistency toleration in science.

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